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Introduction
The development of technical standards have taken on increasing importance with the rise of complexity and global reach of technology. By establishing rules and specifications for products and services, standards facilitate interconnection and interoperability of related products and yield important benefits for the functioning of markets and innovation. In particular, standards can create large, global markets by establishing a common set of characteristics with which different producers can comply. Consequently, they generate economies of scale in production, reduce transaction costs, and foster competition by supporting market recognition of products offered by new entrants. Moreover, by expanding the potential product and patent licensing markets, standards encourage investment in the research and development (R&D) of new technologies.
Despite these clear benefits to static and dynamic efficiencies, standard setting requires coordination by many stakeholders with competing interests, which is often difficult to achieve through market mechanisms. To resolve such market failures, industry players and, in certain instances, government entities have created standard setting organizations (SSOs), whose primary role is coordinating standards development. A critical aspect of standardization is to maintain a workable balance between the creation of incentives for innovation and the promotion of competition and wide adoption of standards in the downstream product market. SSOs therefore generally require its members to both self-disclose and license patents that are technologically essential to the standard or "standard essential patents" (SEPs) to member and non-member firms on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.
Given their impact on competition, technology adoption, and innovation, the process of standard development and mechanisms for declaration and licensing SEPs have been of great interest to policy makers and economists. Recent studies on standard setting have largely focused on the impact of SSOs and SEPs on the development, adoption, and/or diffusion of standards and technological change (e.g. Rysman and Simcoe 2008 , Baron and Pohlmann 2013b , Pohlmann, Neuhäusler and Blind 2016 , the effect of certain SSO rules on standardization and competition (e.g., Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole, 2006; Lemley and Shapiro, 2013; Lerner and Tirole, 2006, 2015) , or patent characteristics associated with disclosed SEPs (e.g. Bekkers, Bongard and Nuvolari 2011) .
However, a notable but under-recognized shortcoming of these studies is that they take as given that patents disclosed as SEPs are truly essential to the standard. While the probalistic nature of patents (Farrell and Shapiro 2008) is accepted in the economic literature, and oppositions and court invalidations have been linked to patent quality (e.g. Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001, Galasso and Schankerman 2015) , the corresponding uncertainty related to standard-essentiality has not attracted attention despite the importance of standards across many industries. The premise of certain essentiality is highly problematic when one considers recent observations by industry experts (e.g. Pohlmann 2016, Bekkers and Updegrove 2012) and policymakers (e.g. European Commission 2016a, European Commission 2016b) that current SSO policies create incentives for patent owners to "over-declare" or to "pad" their patents as being essential to the standard. These critics point to a number of factors related to the lack of clarity in the declaration process, absence of screening mechanisms, and the positive relationship between the number and share of declared SEPs and licensing royalty revenue. For example, the European Commission (2014) suggests that over-declaration rates of SEPs could be as high as 80 percent. Dewatripont and Legros's (2013) theoretical analysis highlights that incentives to over-declare SEPs likely differ across different kind of innovators. However, save for Lerner, Tabakovic and Tirole (2016) , there is little work on SEP over-declaration despite the growing importance and proliferation of standards, and there is no empirical analysis taking advantage of the available technical assessments of actual essentiality that can shed light on the over-declaration issue directly.
In this study, we aim to address this critical gap in literature by providing the first rigorous empirical analysis of patent and owner characteristics associated with SEPs that are evaluated to be actually essential to the declared standard, as determined by independent evaluation of technical essentiality ("judged essentiality"). Although the question of whether an SEP is truly essential or not is ultimately a legal one that can only be determined in a court of law, judged essentiality can provide a useful proxy for the true essentiality of SEPs. We focus on SEPs disclosed to the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) for the 4th-generation cellular telecommunications standard, LTE.
1 . We combine data from ETSI on the characteristics of LTE standard essential patents with independent assessment of their technical essentiality, to assess the prevalence of over-declaration and to analyze patent characteristics that are associated with true essentiality among LTE SEPs. Our paper complements the recent work by Lerner et al. (2016) who focus on patent holders' declaration strategies. They study under which circumstances declarations are made so that individual patents are identified in the declaration, and under which circumstances firms make portfolio-wide blanket declarations covering all owned patents. Technical standardization is particularly important for the telecommunications industry given the industry's fundamental need for global interconnection and interoperability of various products and services. Moreover, new entrants have displaced traditional players in the downstream mobile handset market at increasing rates, creating a divide between innovators and downstream implementers. These factors have led to difficult licensing negotiations and a number of litigations over the validity and the essentiality of patents. Hence, it is especially pertinent and valuable to examine the issue of true essentiality in the telecommunications industry.
Results of our logit regression analysis do not show that SEPs that were either traded or declared as essential to the standard by a non-practicing entity (NPE) would be more or less likely to be judged essential than other SEPs. However, our results clearly show that SEPs declared against a specific technical specification of the LTE standard are more likely to be judged essential than SEPs declared with a reference to the general standard only. Declaration to a specific technical specification increases the likelihood of judged essentiality by 37.3 percent in our preferred regression specification with the largest set of control variables. This finding indicates that firms declaring against a specific standard document understand better the content of the standard and their patents and apply more rigorous internal reviews of declarations. On the other hand, granted patents are around 7.7 percent less likely to be judged essential than patents that have not yet been granted. One explanation for this finding is the time consuming patent application prosecution process that can cause claim text changes so that an initially essential patent application no longer matches the standard once granted. Likewise, standard specifications can also change during the prosecution of a patent application. Patent forward citations, which are the most used proxy for patent quality in economic literature, are in general not correlated with essentiality. However, the count of forward citations from other SEPs declared to the same standard is positively correlated with essentiality, and this correlation is driven by citations from other SEPs judged essential to the same standard. This finding indicates that once forward citations originate from the same standard, they explain technological closeness of the patents. In particular, forward citations from the same standard as a proxy of patent value relate primarily to the likelihood of infringement of the SEPs by the standard specifications. Citations from other patents declared and thus likely to be related to the same standard can be used therefore as a predictor of essentiality, even if their essentiality status of these SEPs has not been assessed. We also find that the shorter length of the first independent claim of the SEP predicts higher likelihood of essentiality. The result is closely related to the finding on forward citations from the same standard, because claim length primarily explains the possibility of infringement by the implementations of the standard specifications. We also investigate how patent validity might be related to essentiality. We construct a variable that measures the similarity between the first independent claims of US and EP patents belonging to the same patent family. If these two claims are similar, it indicates that the underlying innovation meets legal standards and the claim text has been well drafted. Such a claim is more likely to be found valid if tested. We find that claim similarity does not explain technical essentiality, which confirms the view that technical essentiality is primarily related to infringement possibility than to other factors of patent value.
Our findings are important for understanding the impact of standard setting on patent licensing, technological change, and competition in the technology industry. First, policymakers and economists have both stressed that information asymmetries in standard setting, especially in the disclosure and licensing of SEPs, create a number of inefficiencies in the upstream and downstream markets. By providing a better understanding of the prevalence of the over-declaration of SEPs, ownership of truly essential SEPs, and patent characteristics associated with true essentiality, our findings can increase transparency and reduce uncertainty related to the licensing of SEPs and adoption of standards. Second, our findings can inform standard-setting organizations and policymakers in designing policies to reduce over-declaration rates. For example, a requirement to make declarations against specific technical specifications could be made mandatory by SSOs. Third, our findings can serve as the basis for a screening model of true essentiality, which will help to increase efficiency of standardization without imposing the excessively burdensome requirement of patent-by-patent technical analysis. In addition, understanding the empirical determinants of true essentiality can reduce uncertainty about true SEP holdings and thus improve SEP licensing negotiations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides brief institutional background on standard setting and intellectual property rights in SSOs, followed by Section 3, which provides an overview of related literature on over-declaration and essentiality. Section 4 describes the data, and Sections 5 to 7 present our empirical methodology and discuss the results. Section 8 concludes and proposes avenues for future research.
Standard Setting Organizations and Standard Essential Patents

The Role of Standard Setting Organizations
SSOs facilitate several critical functions in technology and market development: discovery, standardization, and self-regulation by establishing a regulatory frame with their IPR policies (Lerner and Tirole 2015) . First, SSOs investigate and certify the technical merits of various combinations of functionalities. Second, following this evaluation process, SSOs select a particular technology for a standard. Each SSO has its own set of procedures for introducing, adjusting, approving, publishing and revising candidate standards. However, most SSOs generally follow an "open-setting procedure," in which the SSO provides information to interested parties on the standard-setting and members attend meetings, vote on the standardization decisions, and contribute technologies to the standard (Baron and Spulber 2015b) . To support the adoption of the standard in the market, an SSO's intellectual property rights (IPR) policy must balance market use of patents covering technologies that are essential to the implementation of the standard (SEPs) with protection of the property rights of these standard essential patents and encouraging continued innovation.
Although an SEP is generally defined as a patent covering an invention essential to a given industry standard such that infringing on that patent is unavoidable in implementing the standard, the definition of what is essential can differ across SSOs (Maskus and Merrill 2013). Most SSOs provide a "technical essentiality" criterion, defining essentiality to mean there are no technological alternatives to implementing the standard. A few SSOs (e.g., IEEE and VITA), however, include the concept of "commercial essentiality" in their IPR policies, meaning that alternatives that do not infringe on the patent exist but are not commercially viable to bring to market. ETSI, the SSO associated with the SEPs analyzed in this paper, explicitly rules out the concept of commercial essentiality in its IPR policies, defining essentiality solely on a technical basis.
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and the 3GPP-LTE Standard
The issue of patent-based standardization is most prominent in the telecommunications industry. At least seven SSOs exist in the telecommunications industry, including the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the organization to which the SEPs analyzed in this study are disclosed. ETSI is an entity focused on information and telecommunications technologies, responsible for developing the GSM and 3G UMTS/W-CDMA standards, and most recently, the LTE standard. The ETSI IPR policy applies to 4G LTE standard analyzed in this study. Over 800 member organizations across 66 countries belong to the ETSI, including many leading companies and R&D organizations. Since 2003, it has collaborated with the European Patent Office to provide public access to an IPR database and library with over 35,000 technical contributions made to ETSI as part of the standardization process.
The Long Term Evolution (LTE) standard is the 4th generation (4G) standard for high-speed wireless communication for mobile phones and data terminals. The standard is developed under the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) which is a partnership between seven regional SSOs and it defines and publishes the technical specifications of the LTE standard. The 3GPP Release 8 of the LTE standard was frozen in December 2008, and the first LTE equipment were build based on this release version. 
Disclosure and Licensing of SEPs
SSO policies regarding SEPs comprise the rules governing disclosure and licensing commitments of its members. Most SSOs require their members to self-disclose patents that are essential to the standard or may become essential to when the final standard is adopted. According to Bekkers and Updegrove (2012) , none of the major SSOs require their members to conduct a patent search for the disclosure process or stipulate a formal process for adjudicating the essentiality of patents. SSO disclosure requirements differ across several dimensions, including rules for the timing and the specificity of the disclosures. Although most SSOs call for disclosures as early as possible, the meaning of what is early is oftentimes imprecisely defined. SSO policies also vary with regard to whether disclosures must identify specific patents that are essential ("specific disclosures") or companies are allowed to make blanket statements that they own essential patents without precisely identifying them ("blanket disclosures"). Some SSOs like ETSI ask for specific patent disclosures while IEEE and others permit blanket disclosures. Importantly, ETSI IPR Policy Section 4.1 calls for patentees to declare even if in doubt: "Subject to Clause 4.2 below, each MEMBER shall use its reasonable endeavours, in particular during the development of a STANDARD or TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION where it participates, to inform ETSI of ESSENTIAL IPRs in a timely fashion. In particular, a MEMBER submitting a technical proposal for a STANDARD or TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION shall, on a bona fide basis, draw the attention of ETSI to any of that MEMBER's IPR which might be ESSENTIAL if that proposal is adopted." [emphasis added] Thus, the IPR Policy is itself a source of declaration imprecision. The Policy aims at capturing all possible SEPs rather than capturing only those patents that are truly essential to the standard. If even in doubt, the patent holder is obliged to declare 4 . Failing to declare has more severe consequences that include loss of enforceability of the patent and possible accusations of patent ambush. Declaring a non-essential patent has significantly fewer consequences, if at all. Consequently, patentees interpreting the policy requirement have varying declaration policies resulting in varying degrees of preciseness in their declarations. Because there is no confirmation nor rejection of the declaration, the accuracy of declarations rests solely on the declaring company. SEP disclosures are typically tied to a requirement that the members license their SEPs to standard implementers on "fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory" (FRAND) terms. However, SSO policies generally do not specify exact licensing terms and remain vague about the meaning of FRAND, which has led to divergent interpretations of FRAND licensing commitments and reliance on courts in licensing negotiations including that the essentiality of declared patents is determined by the courts.
Overview of Literature on Over-Declaration, Patent
Value, and Standard Essential Patents
SEP Over-Declaration
A patent that is declared as an SEP may not be truly essential to the standard for several reasons (European Commission 2014). First, because patents may have been disclosed before the finalization of the standard, the disclosed SEP may no longer be essential to the final standard specification. Second, the patent application of the SEP may have been rejected and therefore the patent is no longer valid or the scope of the application may have been narrowed following the disclosure and is no longer essential to the standard. Third, the patent may not be infringed by particular implementations of the standard, and therefore, is not truly indispensable. In addition to these three cases in which the declaration may have been made appropriately based on information available at the time of the disclosure and in line with the (ETSI) IPR Policy obliging to disclose all patents that might be essential, there can also be "untruthful" disclosures in which parties knowingly declare non-essential patents to be SEPs (European Commission 2014). These false declarations are primarily driven by rent-seeking patent owners who may be interested in influencing the direction of the standard development and/or superficially bolstering the size of their SEP portfolio to increase their bargaining power in licensing negotiations 5 .
In view of these cases of non-essentiality among disclosed patents, industry professionals and policy makers have pointed to a number of factors that can contribute to suspected high over-declaration rate. First, the self-declarations of SEPs by patent holders are subject to minimal or no screening by the SSOs. SSO policies typically only prescribe rules for the availability of patent licenses and their terms and do not outline systematic policies or evaluation mechanisms for assessing whether the patents declared to be SEPs are truly essential to the standard. Second, the process of verifying the technical essentiality of patents is increasingly difficult in light of the rapid evolution and growing complexity of technology. Third, standards and evaluation of patents may change over time, yet SSO policies do not formulate systematic rules for updating declarations of essentiality. Fourth, because failure to disclose SEPs may prevent the patent owner from commercially exploiting its essential patents later on, firms may find it in their best interest to over-disclose. Fifth, patent holders aim to have their technologies incorporated into standards for the revenue stream that this generates through royalties as well as to remain competitive in the market through their knowledge of the technology. In summary, over-declaration of SEPs results from the lack of transparent and systematic screening and updating mechanisms for essentiality, the difficulty and the high cost of verifying essentiality, and large incentives to own larger shares of the SEPs yielding bargaining power in license negotiations.
Recent findings from technical assessments of SEPs and outcomes from patent litigations indicate over-declaration to be a highly prevalent phenomenon. For example, a series of tech-nical evaluation of SEPs in telecommunications industry by Fairfield Resources International, an intellectual property consultancy, indicate that as high as 80 percent of declared essential patents are not truly essential (e.g., Fairfield Resources International 2007 , Fairfield Resources International 2010 . Cyber Creative Institute find that the overall essentiality rate for patents declared for LTE standard is 58 percent (Cyber Creative Institute 2012). Outcomes from patent litigations in the telecommunications industry show similar rates of over-declaration. For example, in a 2005 patent litigation in the UK, Nokia alleged that 31 of InterDigital's SEPs were not essential to the UMTS standard; prior to the trial, InterDigital dropped essentiality claims for 26 (or 84 percent) of these patents (Bekkers and West 2009) . Although the question of true essentiality is ultimately a legal question that can be only be determined in a court of law, detailed technical assessments of SEPs and patent owners' responses to challenges in litigation provide useful guidance on the prevalence of over-declaration.
Determinants of Patent Value and Essentiality
Our study is related to three strands of research on patent value and standard setting: (1) literature on the general relation between patent characteristics and their value, (2) theoretical models of SEPs and the impact of the SSO and standardization on competition, and (3) empirical assessment of characteristics of SEPs. Although many of these previous studies recognize the problem of over-declaration, they largely ignore the issue of uncertainty about the true essentiality in the implementation of theoretical and empirical analyses.
First, there exists a large body of literature on using patent characteristics as a measure of the value of a patent. The attribute that has been the focus of these studies is the number of citations that a patent receives from subsequent patents, or "forward citations". Viewing technological progress as a cumulative process in which new advances and inventions are built on previous knowledge and facilitate subsequent discoveries, researchers have proposed that the number of forward citations provide information about broad technological impact of the patent. A large number of studies have established that there is a positive relation between forward citations and private value of the patents (see e.g., Harhoff, Narin, Scherer and Vopel 1999 , Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001 , Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2005 , Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and Stoffman 2012 as well as social value of patents (Trajtenberg 1990) , and this relation has been confirmed also in studies with field trial data (Moser, Ohmstedt and Rhode 2014) and patent auction data (Odasso, Scellato and Ughetto 2014) . Research, however, also shows that the number of forward citation is a noisy measure of the economic or technological value of the patent. As noted by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) , Rysman and Simcoe (2008) and Moser (2016) , several other factors other than the quality of patents, including publicity, licensing practices, or technological features, can impact citation counts. In addition, these studies show that the predictive power of patent value models is improved by the addition of other patent characteristics, such as patent scope, the year of patent application and/or publication, patent inventor and owner characteristics, technology category, and patent family characteristics, indicating that multiple attributes of patents are important correlates of economic and/or technological value. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) confirm this by showing that using multiple variables improves over a single composite index in measuring patent quality. This strand of literature, however, has not analyzed SEPs as a distinct patent category, and as such, patent attributes associated with standardization have not been included in the analyses.
Theoretical or discussion studies related to SEPs have focused on assessing the impact of SSOs and SEPs on the development, adoption, and/or diffusion of standards and technologies or the effect of SSO rules on competition and bargaining powers of patent owners and licensors (e.g. Chiao, Lerner and Tirole 2007 , Lerner and Tirole 2006 , Simcoe 2012 , Lemley and Shapiro 2013 , Kühn, Scott Morton and Howard 2013 , Lerner and Tirole 2015 . However, these studies take as given the true essentiality of patents that are disclosed as SEPs and do not explicitly explore the issue of over-declaration. One exception is Dewatripont and Legros (2013) who develop a theoretical model to study market distortions that arise from patent owners' private information about the essentiality of the patent. Their model provides several predictions on how FRAND-like setting in SSOs affects incentives to invest in R&D and the essentiality rate of patents that firms declare. In a working paper version of Dewatripont and Legros (2013) , they consider an extension of the model in which an upstream and a vertically-integrated firm are both involved in patenting. The model predicts that an upstream firm is more likely to over-declare than a vertically-integrated firm, because firms with a stronger dependence on licensing income from SEPs may have a greater incentive to over-declare. Another exception is recent work by Lerner et al. (2016) . They look at patent holders' strategies when to disclose patents by identifying them individually ("specific disclosure") and when to make a generic disclosure (or "blanket declaration"). They validate the theoretical results with cross-SSO data by showing that lower quality patents and firms in downstream position are more likely associated with generic disclosures.
Recently, an emerging body of empirical studies on SEPs examines the differences between SEPs and non-essential patents and analyzes the relationship between SSOs and the disclosure of standard essential patents. Rysman and Simcoe (2008) examine the economic and technological significance of SSOs by analyzing the forward citation patterns of patents that were disclosed to be standard essential to four major SSOs. They find that SEPs are cited more frequently and over a longer time period than non-SEPs, which suggests that SEPs may have higher than average economic and technological value across all patents. Rysman and Simcoe (2008) also note that SEPs are different from non-SEPs in other potential determinants of patent value noted in prior research. SEPs contain more claims, are more likely to be part of a larger patent family, and are cited by patents from broader set of technology classes than patents that are not disclosed to the SSOs. The authors further find that the age distribution of SEP citations is shifted toward later years relative to non-SEP citations with the same application year and that the citations increase following their disclosure to the SSO. These results suggest that SSOs play a significant role in influencing the development of standards and the adoption of valuable technologies. An important limitation to Rysman and Simcoe (2008) is that they are unable to identify whether a disclosed patent is actually essential to the final specification of the standard. Consequently, their sample of patents contains "false positives" or disclosures that are not actually essential. Layne-Farrar and Padilla (2011) and Baron and Pohlmann (2013b) confirm the finding by Rysman and Simcoe (2008) on the endogenous relationship between the quality of SEPs and development of standards by SSOs.
Layne-Farrar and Padilla (2011) find that SEPs increase in value (as measured by forward citations) when included in a standard. The authors suggest that this effect is heterogeneous across SSOs, application year, standard, and jurisdiction. Baron and Pohlmann (2013b) find that the disclosure or the inclusion of a greater number of SEPs to the standard increases the likelihood that the standard would be upgraded but decreases the probability of standard replacement and that these effects depend on the level of ownership fragmentation in the SEPs. These findings indicate that SEPs may accelerate the technological improvement of existing standards but stall significant changes to the standard. Pohlmann et al. (2016) test for the economic value of SEPs to patent holding companies by assessing the relationship between the rate of return on assets and the number of SEPs that the company holds. They find an inverted U-shaped relation between SEP holdings and financial returns. Holding and licensing SEPs can increase a company's return, which encourages firms to become involved in the standardization process and to declare many SEPs. However, the sign of the relation is reversed after a certain number of SEP disclosures. The authors attribute this change to an "over-declaration" problem of SEPs, in which a very large number of patent disclosures may lead firms to offer fewer products and services and develop lower quality patents. The "over-declaration" problem noted by Pohlmann et al. (2016) is thus different from the over-declaration problem addressed in this paper which concerns the true essentiality of patents that are disclosed to the SSOs. They also find that controlling for firm-fixed effects and patent attributes improves the predictive power of their model, suggesting that the relation between financial return and SEPs can vary across different company and patent types. Bekkers et al. (2011) provide an important empirical study on the determinants of essential patent disclosures and demonstrate the importance of patent and company attributes in SEPs. They assess the role of two main factors -(1) the significance of the technological solution in the patent and (2) the involvement of the patent applicant in the standardization processby comparing SEPs declared to the W-CDMA standard with a control group of non-SEPs. Bekkers et al. (2011) find that both factors have significant impact on the probability that a patent is claimed as essential, but the applicant's involvement in the standardization process has a stronger impact. The empirical results also demonstrate that various patent and patent applicant characteristics including forward citations, region of application, company size and R&D expenditures are significantly correlated with the likelihood of a disclosure.
In sum, these theoretical and empirical studies on SEPs reveal the importance of patent, applicant/owner, and SSO characteristics in determining the likelihood and the value of SEP disclosures. Furthermore, participants to standardization and patentees may differ with respect to their declaration policies as some firms have more inclusive policies to declare than others. This is in-line with the findings by Lerner et al. (2016) mentioned earlier. Kang and Bekkers (2015) raise the possibility of opportunistic patenting during standardization meetings, though in our discussions with industry and standardization participants, these concerns were downplayed and the possibility that problems arising during meetings are sought to be addressed imminently was emphasised. However, the findings by Kang and Bekkers (2015) underline the imperfections in the standardization and declaration processes and the differences in SSO members' policies. In all though, these studies largely ignore the issue of true essentiality of SEPs in their analyses, though Bekkers et al. (2011) note that all declarations are not actually essential and determining essentiality is a hard task. To our knowledge, our current study is the first rigorous and, to-date, the most complete examination of the determinants of true essentiality among SEPs.
Description of Data Sources
Data Sources
To conduct our study, we combine data from four different sources: (1) ETSI database on IPR and standards, (2) PA Consulting data on patents that are declared to the 3GPP-LTE standard and results from PA Consulting's independent assessment of the SEP's technical essentiality, (3) PATSTAT data including bibliographical and legal status information, and (4) COMPUSTAT data on various patent inventor and owner company metrics.
ETSI Database
ETSI maintains a database which provides information about the IPRs that have been disclosed to be SEPs to the various standards that ETSI has developed. ETSI provides at least two types of information. The first is the description of the technological standards and all the relevant versions, and the second is the list of self-declared SEPs. PA Consulting (described below) uses the second type of information for its technical assessment of essentiality.
PA Consulting Database
Patents disclosed to be essential to the LTE (4G) standard in the ETSI database were matched to the patents evaluated by PA Consulting (PA) for their technical essentiality claims. PA is a consulting firm focusing on the technology and innovation industries. Since the mid-1990s, PA has examined IPR in wireless technology, beginning in GSM, followed by 3G, CDMA, and LTE. Beginning with the 3G standard, PA has developed databases containing PA's independent evaluation of the patents that are disclosed to be standard essential to various wireless standards. Our study relies on PA's database on the LTE standard. In February 2016, PA published the latest version of the "LTE Essential IPR: PA's 3GPP-LTE Database and Report" accompanied by an online database which contains a record of patents that PA has evaluated.
To assess the technical essentiality of SEPs to the LTE standard, PA's neutral technical experts compared the patent's independent claims (i.e., those that do not reference other claims) to the relevant sections of ETSI's 3GPP-LTE standard specifications (Release 11). Patents declared as essential and stored on the ETSI database under projects relating to LTE were selected based on the following criteria: (1) relate to LTE, (2) declarations up to end of July 2013, and (3) contain at least 1 declaration from an ETSI member company.
Projects that related to the LTE-Advanced standard or those covering features preceeding Release 8 were not included in the pool of evaluated patents.
Where PA was able to reach a conclusion about the essentiality of the patent, PA ranked the patents from 1 through 3 according to how essential they are to the standard from a technical perspective:
• 1 = All the elements of the claim match the technical specifications of the LTE standard and hence the patent is probably essential to the technical standard
• 2 = The patent is relevant to the technical standard (a useful implementation method, but not directly described in the standard)
• 3 = The patent is not relevant to the technical standard in any way or at least one element of the claim does not match the standard
For patents where assessment results were unclear, PA errors on the side of caution by classifying these patents as technically essential (i.e., rank of 1). The PA database is based on ETSI IPR database disclosures to the end of July 2013 and contains 6,505 disclosed patents for LTE. Of these disclosed patents, PA successfully analyzed 4,628 patents.
The patent evaluation and the creation of the database were conducted in four steps:
1. Identification of LTE SEPs: The set of patents declared to ETSI for LTE were identified in the ETSI IPR Database.
2. Location of US family member: The set of disclosed patents were filtered by identifying a US granted patent or application; duplicates were identified and flagged.
3. Comparison of claims with LTE standard's technical specifications: The claims of the patents were evaluated by PA's engineers and ranked.
4. Creation of Database: Patent numbers, assignees, PA's rankings, and other data were incorporated into a database.
In addition to the ranking of essentiality, the PA database also provides information on the current ownership of the patent from Thomson Reuters and patent family characteristics. It is worth pointing out that PA assesses applications too, and their report states that an essential application may have its claims narrowed down which renders the granted patent not-essential despite the assessed application being judged essential.
PATSTAT
PATSTAT contains bibliographical and legal status patent data from patent authorities from leading industrialized and developing countries. PATSTAT is extracted from the EPO's databases and is provided as raw data for statistical tools. It contains information relating to more than 90 million patent documents from 40 patent authorities worldwide.
There are three main databases in PATSTAT:
• EPO worldwide patent statistical database: contains bibliographical data relating to more than 90 million patent documents from leading industrialized and developing countries.
• EPO worldwide legal status database: contains legal status data on patent applications and granted patents from more than 40 patent authorities worldwide.
• European patent register: contains bibliographic and legal status data on published European and Euro-PCT patent applications
COMPUSTAT
Standard & Poor's Compustat database provides various financial and company information on the inventor and the current owners of the SEPs in the study: R&D expenditure, number of employees, returns to assets, and value of intangible assets.
Sample Selection
Our data include only SEPs evaluated by PA Consulting that can be linked to the ETSI database. Of the 79,257 patents in the ETSI database (which contains information on disclosed SEPs to various standards that ETSI developed including the LTE standard), 3,953 patents were matched by their patent application number to the set of SEPs that were evaluated by PA. From the match sample of SEPs, 35 patents were dropped from the base sample, because the ETSI data shows that they were not declared to the 4G standard in the data. In addition, only SEPs that were declared to the US patent office were kept in the base sample, which resulted in the removal of four SEPs. In sum, 3,914 SEPs are included in our base sample.
Empirical Methods
We estimate a logit regression model to assess the impact of key attributes of patents and characteristics of inventor and owner companies on the likelihood that the disclosed patent is essential:
Essentiality of patent p in family f with application year of t is estimated as a function of patent characteristics X p , patent family characteristics X f , age characteristics T t , inventing owner attributes or fixed effects I p , and declaring owner attributes or fixed effects O p .
Dependent Variable: Essentiality
Although PA provides a ranking of 1 through 3, we combine rank of 2 and 3 to create a dichotomous variable of essentiality in our analysis:
• 1 : PA rank = 1
• 0 : PA rank = 2 or 3
Summary of Potential Determinants of Essentiality
Existing literature on patents and studies specifically related to SEPs both demonstrate the importance of several categories of patent and inventor or owner characteristics on patent value and the likelihood of disclosure. We consider four groups of potential explanatory factors.
Patent Citations
Existing studies indicate that number of citations that a patent receives is positively correlated with the economic and technological value of the patent. The previous literature has largely focused on the impact of the number of overall forward citations but the relation between citations and the value of the patent may differ depending on the type of citation as well as the timing of these citations. Furthermore, our focus is on true essentiality of a patent declared as standard-essential, and correlation between overall forward citations and true essentiality might be weaker than the correlation between forward citations and economic or technological value. In our regression model, we consider the impact of forward citations, selfcitations, and citations from non-patent literature. Importantly and novel, we also consider the disparate impact of forward citations received from other patents that were declared to the standard, and also from those judged essential to the standard (PA Rank = 1). The idea in separating "within" standard citations and "external" citations is to test the hypothesis of cumulative innovation in standardisation. The LTE standard is created by a series of inventions over many years and it is built on previous generations of telecommunications standards. The best prior art for a SEP is the previous standard because of backward compatibility requirement. Therefore if a patent receives citations from subsequent patents within the line of standardization, it can be expected to be more relevant for the standard and thus more likely to be judged as essential. Forward citations from the same standard thus indicate a higher likelihood that the SEP is infringed by the implementations of the standard. Conversely, a citation received from a patent that does not cover the standard can be expected not to reflect on the actual essentiality of the cited patent to the standard in question. Belenzon (2011) too distinguishes between citations that are coming from subsequent patents within the same cumulative line of innovation and citations outside of the innovation line. He finds that the former "internal" citations are positively related to firm's stock market value, whereas the latter "external" citations are not. The use of citations, however, is complicated when comparing patents with different ages. Older patents are more likely to have received a greater number of citations simply by the virtue of the fact that they have had longer period of time to receive them. The problem may be aggravated by potential changes in the patent and citations practices over time. Thus, to mitigate this issue, we age-normalize the citation counts and control for patent application year fixed effects in all of our specifications. Patent citations counts are also standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation of 1, such that the coefficient on citation counts can be interpreted as the change in the likelihood of essentiality associated with a one standard deviation change in citation counts.
Basic Patent Characteristics
Previous studies indicate patent age is associated with patent value. Patents that were declared earlier to the standard may have claims for technologies that are more fundamental to the implementation of the standard. They could have also influenced the development of the standard. Thus, patents that were declared early could be more likely to be essential. We include application year fixed effects in all our model specifications. A patent application that is granted has undergone and passed examination and, thus, may be more likely to be essential. On the other hand, the claims of a granted patent may be more narrow and less likely to cover the standard's elements, and therefore a granted patent may be less likely judged essential compared to the patent application. Existing studies also demonstrate that patent technology class impacts citation counts and valuation. We consider variables that indicate whether the patent application was granted and indicators for broad patent technology classes. We also study the impact these categories of attributes that are associated with the family of patents to which a particular SEP belongs.
A natural place to look at for information about the value of the patent, or about its essentiality to the standard, is the scope of the patent. As Lerner (1994) notes "The best way to measure patent scope might be through subjective assessments." Consequently, economics literature has turned to proxies for patent scope, including IPC codes (Lerner 1994 ) and the number of claims (Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001) . Independent claims form the basis for the patent's claim structure, and therefore the analysis on the claims' quality can be narrowed down to these. We develop two approaches to measure claim quality, and examine how these measures of patent quality are related to standard essentiality of SEPs. First, we look at the number of independent claims and the length of the first independent claim in the subsample of granted patents.
6 A shorter first independent claim corresponds to a broader scope of the patented invention, and thus to higher patent quality. This measure of claim value relates primarily to the likelihood of the standard specification infringing the declared SEP. Likewise, a patent with more granted independent claims is more broad in its coverage of the patented invention. Second, we further compare the first independent claim of the granted US patents in our sample to the first independent claim of the corresponding EP patent within the same patent family, if the EP grant exists. If these two claim lengths match closely, it indicates that the claim has passed examination relatively intact, thus there should be less concerns about the validity of the patent in particular. de Rassenfosse, Jaffe and Webster (2016) have recently shown that European patent examiners on average employ a stricter examination standard than their US colleagues. Several patent practitioners have told us to use such similarity measures when starting to assess the general quality of a patent. Our implementation of claim similarity is to compute cosine similarity, a commonly used measure of similarity in text analysis, of the first independent claim of corresponding EP and US grants. Secondly, we identify certain key words that limit the breadth of the claim and therefore reduce the quality of the patent. Words such as "maximum", "minimum", and "only" in a claim limit its breadth and therefore are expected to reduce the quality of the patent. Patent practitioners typically look for such limiting words in claims when assessing the quality of the patent. Therefore, we include a dummy variable equal to one if any of the above stated limiting keywords exist in the first claim. However, we do not find any effect of this dummy on judged essentiality, and we thus do not report the results of this specification. We leave more sophisticated claim similarity analysis with e.g. natural language processing for future work.
Disclosure Attributes
The nature of the patent's disclosure would likely be associated with the underlying true essentiality of the patent. SEPs that are declared against a specific technical specification document are more likely to be essential than a patent without a reference to such document. The hypothesis is that a firm who declares against a specific technical specification knows both the standard and the patent contents better and is thus able to make a more informed decision on the appropriateness of the declaration compared to a firm who declares patents against the general standard on high level only. We also examine the impact of declaration against earlier generation of the cellular standard on which LTE builds. There are two reasons why there might be an effect. Firstly, firms that have been involved in the development of cellular standards for a long time may have better understanding of the standard, and can therefore make more informed declaration decisions, compared to a firm that just recently joined standardization at 4G LTE phase and who does not have similar knowledge of the technologies. Secondly, LTE standard technologies build on earlier generations, and therefore declarations to 2G or 3G standards may involve more fundamental technologies that are carried over to 4G, and therefore patents covering these areas may be more likely essential.
Patent Inventor and Ownership
Existing studies show that the likelihood of true essentiality might be associated with the identity of the company holding the patent. We assess how the identity of the patent owner declaring the patent as essential or the patentee is associated with the likelihood of true essentiality through two approaches. First, we include fixed effects for the inventor and the current owner to control for the variation in true essentiality across the set of companies associated with SEPs disclosed to the LTE standard. While useful, the inclusion of company fixed effects does not reveal what company attributes explain variability in the likelihood of true essentiality. Second, we thus include various attributes for inventing and declaring owner companies related to their size, financial performance, R&D expenditure, and a dummy variable indicating a non-practicing entity (NPE). We further control for changes in ownership and whether the essentiality declaration was made by somebody other than the patent's inventor. The inclusion of these characteristics allows us to assess whether traded SEPs differ from non-traded SEPs in terms of true essentiality. Table ( I) presents descriptive statistics on the patent and company characteristics. The first two columns stratify the statistics by essentiality ranking, where non-essential SEPs are defined as those patents with a PA ranking of 2 and 3 and essential SEPs are defined as patents with PA ranking of 1. The last column presents statistics on the full dataset. The patents in our base sample received, on average, approximately 39.1 forward citations, although the relatively high standard deviation of around 62.1 indicates a wide variation. Patents that are judged essential received close to three more forward citations on average than those that are not judged to be essential patents by PA. The difference in received citations between essential and non-essential patents is more pronounced when considering the number of citations from other patents that were judged to be essential by PA. Compared to non-essential patents, essential patents receive around 70 percent more citations from other judged essential patents. However, we observe no differences in the average number of citations from the non-patent literature. As can be expected, the great majority of the patents belong to the electricity technology category, although approximately 12.2 percent of the patents also belong to the physics technology category. There are no noticeable differences in the technology category groupings between essential and non-essential patents.
Descriptive Statistics
About 79.1 percent of the patent applications in our sample have been granted by the patent authorities, and the proportion of granted patents is slightly higher among non-essential patents than essential patents. Only about 2 percent of the patents in our sample are lapsed, which is not surprising given that these are patents that have been declared to be standard essential. On average, the patents in our sample are about five and a half years old (from date of declaration); essential patents were declared slightly earlier than non-essential patents, on average.
Just over 20.7 percent of the patents were also declared to either 2G or 3G standard prior to being declared to the 4G standard. There is a substantial difference in the share declared to a specific technical specification document of the LTE standard between essential and non-essential patents. Over 96.1 percent of essential patents were declared to specific technical specification rather than to the general LTE standard on high level while only 81.9 percent of non-essential patents are. Non-essential patents are slightly more likely to be the first patent declared to the LTE standard in their patent family than essential patents.
On average, there are no noticeable differences in declaring owner attributes between non-essential and essential patents: whether the declaring owner is a non-practicing entity, whether the declaring owner is the same as the inventor firm, or how many changes in ownership there has been for a given patent. About 7.5 percent of the patents were declared by an NPE, and over 64.6 percent of the patents were declared by the patent inventor.
Essential patents tend to be owned by firms that are slightly smaller as measured by the number of employees and, somewhat surprisingly, lower levels of R&D expenses. However, given the wide variance in these measures, these differences are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Finally, essential patents belong to families with a greater number of patents (i.e., family size) and they are part of families that tend to receive higher number of citations.
Figure (I) illustrates the declaration rates and the mean essentiality rates of the SEPs in our dataset over time, grouping the patents by the year in which the patent was first declared to ETSI as essential for the 3GPP standard. Figure (I ) reflects that some of these SEPs were first declared as essential to 2G or 3G before the start of the formal LTE development in 2005 and the freezing of the first LTE standard in 3GPP Standard Release 8 at the end of 2008. Figure (I) highlights two general trends. First, declarations of patents to LTE continue to rise after the publication of the first LTE standard release with a large number of declarations only after 2010. Second, patents declared as essential around the first LTE release are most likely judged essential by PA whereas especially the large number of patents declared after the first LTE release have lower rates of technical essentiality in PA Consulting's assessment.
The combination of increasing declaration rates and a decreasing mean essentiality assessments also relates to the need of increased transparency recently voiced by policymakers and practioners. Figure (I) is also a reminder that the development of the cellular 3GPP standards is an ongoing process with a sequence of generations and new standard releases adding additional features and specifications over time.
Empirical Results
We estimate a logit model of SEP essentiality, where essentiality is defined as 1, if the PA rank is 1, and 0 otherwise. All model specifications include application year, application owner, declaration owner, and IPC technology field fixed effects. We employ three specifications that differ in their inclusion of variables related to forward citations, but otherwise include the same various characteristics associated with the patent, its declaration and ownership, as well as patent family composition. All results are reported in the form of average marginal effects.
In section 7.1, we first analyze the determinants of essentiality with the broadest dataset that includes both applications and granted patents. In the section 7.2 following, we focus on the quality of the patent claim and its impact on essentiality. We introduce new variables for patent literature based on the scope and quality of the independent claims of the SEP. We draw these variables from in-depth interviews with technical patent experts who are involved in assessments of patents' quality, technical essentiality, and suitability for litigation. For the analysis in this section we limit the data first to granted US patents only, and then to patents that have both granted US and EP family members.
Determinants of essentiality
The estimation results for the Logit Model (1) are reported in Table (II) . The estimated magnitude and statistical significance of the patent, declaration, ownership, and patent family related characteristics are robust to the different forms of the forward citation variable that we vary in the three different specifications. Our baseline specification (1) includes the standardized count of normalized forward citations (mean=0, sd=1) and an indicator for forward citation by non-patent literature. We find no relationship between normalized forward citation count and the likelihood that the SEP is judged essential. Citations by non-patent literature are also not related to judged essentiality. These results are somewhat unexpected given the robust results from previous literature that has established a positive link between received forward citations and the quality of the patent. On the other hand, PA assessed the technical merits of SEPs against the technical standard specifications, and in that light, it is less surprising that general forward citations from any subsequent patent or citations by any non-patent literature are not predicting technical essentiality of SEPs declared to the particular LTE standard. Our finding suggests that true (technical) essentiality, a key factor of SEP value, is not explained by general forward citations that are used as a measure of patent value (though they are known to be imperfect predictor of patent value). In order to understant our finding better, we further investigate the association between citation counts and essentiality in the two other model specifications.
It is nonetheless likely that forward citations from patents closely related to the standard in question might be informative of essentiality (i.e. infringement of the patent by the standard implmentations) even if general forward citations are not. We thus include the normalized and standardized forward citation count from other patents declared to 4G LTE standard in the specification (2). We normalize this citation count by age across all of these 4G SEPs. Table ( II) shows that age-normalized citations from SEPs declared to the same standard are a statistically significant predictor of judged essentiality. A one standard deviation in age-normalized forward citations from other patents declared to the same standard (equivalent to about 20 citations) increases the likelihood of a patent being judged essential by 3.3 percent while the coefficient on overall forward citations and citations by the non-patent literature remain statistically and economically insignificant. In specification (3), we further investigate the statistical relationship between forward citations and essentiality judgement by also including the count of forward citations from other declared LTE patents that PA has judged as essential. We also normalize this citation count by age across all LTE SEPs judged essential. Inclusion of this additional citation count as an independent variable shows that the correlation between the age-normalized forward citations from other declared SEPs and essentiality is entirely driven by the citations from SEPs that have been judged as essential. A one standard deviation in age-normalized forward citations from other patents declared and judged essential to the same standard (equivalent to about 3 citations) increases the likelihood of a patent being judged essential by 3.0 percent. Specification (2) nevertheless highlights that forward citations from other declared SEPs of the same standard is a statistically and economically significant predictor of technical essentiality, even if their technical essentiality is unknown. Forward citations within the same line of technical standardisation are thus a good predictor of essentiality, which helps in ex post assessment of essentiality. While a statistical assessment of essentiality may not be appropriate for individual patents, it gives us a cost-efficient method to establish a meaningful indication of ownership of truly essential SEPs on (larger) portfolio level. This may be helpful in litigation or regulatory review context when it is unfeasible or financially impossible to acquire patent specific technical assessments of all SEPs individually. Forward citations are particularly helpful in situations when we are interested in historical declarations, but they naturally are not available when assessing contemporaneous SEP declarations. For such cases, we need predictors of essentiality based on existing data.
We use specification (2) in Table (II) to discuss the other patent characteristics not related to forward citations. Granted patents are 8.0 percent less likely to be judged essential than patent applications. This finding may be attributed to the narrowing of the patent claims as well as to changes in the standard specifications during and after the patent review process. Allowing declarations of patent applications increases the ambiguity around true essentiality, but a policy banning these declarations does not necessarily lead to improvement. Firstly, it may result in more situations where firms fail to declare actually essential patents by mistake. Secondly, it may make SEP licensing more cumbersome. A potential licensee will be interested in getting a license to all possible SEPs, including applications, in order to eliminate the risk of future litigation by the patent holder. In order to assess the true strength of the SEP portfolio, the licensee needs information about the SEP holdings of the patent owner, and if applications were not allowed to be declared, the licensee would not have any information about potentially valuable essential patents which are not yet been granted. This problem is aggravated by the time lag between filing a patent application (and often combined with making a contribution to the standard around the same time) and the application becoming first public and then later having the application being granted. More work on grant lags, changes in essentiality status during application prosecution, and potential effects for license negotiations is needed to establish a robust policy recommendation. Lapsed patents on the other hands are not less likely to be judged essential, and neither are patents declared first in the family. We account for the relationship between the time of declaration and essentiality assessments using dummy variables for the year in which the patents were first declared to ETSI as essential. Using the year 2009 with the first freeze of the LTE standard (Release 8) in 3GPP at the end of 2008 as the base category, these dummy variables clearly show that patents first declared around the development of this first LTE release are most likely be judged essential, whereas especially declarations in later years are ceteris paribus less likely to be judged essential. Note that we estimate these effects while simultaneously controlling for application-year fixed effect. This pattern shows that contributions in early phase of standardization may be more fundamental and thus patents covering areas specified in the early releases have therefore higher likelihood of essentiality. It may also be the case that fundamental innovations are rarer, and therefore the pool of patents from which declarations are made has less patents but they are more relevant to the standard on average compared to later years. Declarations to later releases on the other hand can cover areas that, while describing useful solutions of specific technical problems, may not be sole solutions to the problem and thus not implemented by the standard, or the solutions described in the SEPs may be helpful for the implementation of the standard, but still fall out-of-scope of the exact standard specification (remember that the requirement is to delcare all patents that might be essential). Furthermore, there can be more alternatives for the standard specification associated with the later standard areas, and therefore a declared patent may more likely cover those specifications that do not end in the final standard. An alternative explantion to the found pattern is that declarations made in the early standardization years are made by firms who are on average more experienced compared to later years. These experienced firms may have better knowledge of the preceeding technologies which LTE is built on, better knowledge how standardization process works, and they may have higher quality internal review processes for declarations, compared to new comer firms who just join telecommunications standardization at the 4G phase.
A specific, earlier declaration of essentiality to a previous generation of the studied standard (in this case 2G GSM or 3G UMTS) does not reduce the likelihood of a patent also declared to 4G LTE as being judged essential to this current standard generation. However, patents that are declared so that the declaration refers to a specific technical specification document rather than referring only to the general LTE standard are substantially more likely to be judged essential. Patents declared to a specific technical specification of the standard are more than 38.6 percent more likely to be judged essential than patents with a general declaration to LTE, and this result is statistically significant at the one-percent level. Declaration to a specific technical specification is potentially a sign of thorough internal review and potentially also demonstrates deeper understanding of the standard. This major result strongly encourages a move towards allowing only declarations that refer to specific technical specifications of the standard by the SSOs. Declarations, which simply refer to LTE require limited review of the declarations, and naturally capture all possibly essential patents more broadly, appear to be however much too impricise and one of the most significant contributors to over-declaration of SEPs.
Family size, frequently used as a proxy for patent value, is not associated with the technical essentiality of a declared SEP, and reflects our finding on general forward citations which indicates that the traditional proxies for patent value fail to adequately explain true essentiality. Ownership fragmentation of the patent family, measured as the number of distinct owners of the family, is also not related to technical essentiality. Declaration of the patent as essential to LTE by either the original inventor or by a non-practicing entity (NPE) also does not affect the likelihood of the patent as being judged as essential by PA's technical experts. Neither does the number of ownership changes so we do not find any evidence of traded SEPs being less likely to be technically essential.
Our regression specifications further include characteristics of the firms applying for the patent and declaring it as essential. Return on assets is a proxy variable for investment, R&D expenses ($ millions) capture the overall level of investment in technological innovation and development, and the number of employees (hundreds) is a measure of firm size. Note, that we include these variables in addition to both application-owner and declaration-owner fixed effects, and the results are robust to the exclusion of these firm-level fixed effects from the logit regression. We do not find empirical evidence that these company-specific attributes of applicants and declarants are associated with the patent's judged essentiality after controlling for these fixed effects. The estimated coefficients on R&D expenses of the declarant and the return on assets of the applicant are statistically significant at the 5 percent or 10 percent level but neither effect is economically significant. We do not report firm-level fixed effects to protect PA's clients.
Claim Analysis of Granted Patents
We also explore how characteristics related to the quality and scope of claims of granted patents relate to technical essentiality. Table (III) reports the results of our regressions using the subsample of granted US patents with additional explanatory variables. Our primary results discussed in the previous sections hold in direction, magnitude, and statistical significance for these regressions. The existence of a corresponding EP patent grant (if applied) is however not correlated with the essentiality assessment of the US grant. Having one more granted independent claim increases the likelihood of technical essentiality by 1.1 percent. Our interpretation for this finding is that the patent's claim on the applicability of the patented invention increases in the number of independent claims, and that a patent with more independent claims is thus more likely to cover an essential feature of the standard. We further find that the length of the first claim, measured by the number of words, is negatively related to PA's essentiality assessment. Patent practitioners often start their work with looking at the length of the independent claims. A shorter claim is regarded as a more useful and valuable, as it is more general and thus covers a broader set of implementations. We find that increasing the length of the first claim by one standard deviation, around 14 words in our dataset, lowers the likelihood of essentiality by 3.2 percent. This result agrees with the general view from practice that longer claims are likely less general in nature and thus more specific and narrow which increases the likelihood that the claim does not exactly match the standard specification text, and therefore the standard specification does not infringe the declared SEP. This result is interesting as it agrees with the proxies for patent value capturing infringement and used in practice, and it agrees with the results on forward citations from other declared (and judged) essential patents.
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We further explore to what extent differences in the similarity of the first claim between granted US and EP patents relates to technical essentiality. Claim similarity is a measure used by practitioners as a starting point for patent assessment, in particular the assessment of patent validity. If the claims found in a US and an EP patent match closely, it indicates that the invention described in the claim is clear and the claim text is well-drafted, and the patent is more likely valid. The value of such claim can be expected to be above average. Table ( IV) reports our regression specifications for the subsample of these successful twin patent applications. We include the cosine similarity of the term-document matrix of the first claim of each EP and US patent. While this similarity is often used by practitioners, this measure does not correlate with the technical essentiality assessment PA Consulting has performed for the US family member. This finding is explained by the distinction between the concepts of validity and essentiality that was emphasised by the patent practitioners we intereviewed.
Concluding Remarks
The over-declaration of standard-essential patents has become an important topic for industry professionals and policymakers alike. However, economists have ignored this important issue in their research despite having studied standardization for a long time. Transparency, especially with regards to telecommunications standards and the patents essential to them, will likely become even more important in the future. The Internet of Things (IoT) will lead to the deployment of telecommunications standards such as 4G LTE or the future 5G in a broad range of industries. To our knowledge, this article is the first study of the determinants of true essentiality of standard-essential patents. We study the determinants of true essentiality of patents declared essential to the 4G LTE cellular standard using a novel and rich dataset combining various patent characteristics with independent technical assessments of standard essentiality.
We employ a logistic regression to assess the relation between essentiality and a broad set of variables that prior economics literature has found to correlate with patent value. Our results suggest that models explaining patent value are not sufficient to explain the technical essentiality of an SEP. We thus investigated new variables linked to standardization process and variables motivated by the work by patent practitioners. We find that the strongest predictor for essentiality is when the declaration of the SEP refers to a specific technical specification of the standard. This leads to a policy recommendation that SSOs should recommend patent holders to declare against technical specifications. This policy would reduce over-declaration, but it should be kept in mind that it puts more burden on patent holders and may lead to a higher probability that a patent holder fails to make a declaration by accident. We also find support for claim quality based variables, but this area requires further work. In a future version of this paper we will expand the analysis to study additional determinants of SEP essentiality to further increase the policy relevance of this study.
Standard development and declarations of SEPs are very complex processes in telecommunications, and any policy recommendation needs to be carefully balanced. Statistical analysis is helpful in the analysis of large data, but the results should not be applied in assessments of individual patents. This should be kept in mind when developing policies for telecommunication standards. However, our results are encouraging and provide guidance for the policy debate, and hopefully attract more research in order to further the discussion around SEPs and SSO policies.
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